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Abstract. Current intrusion detection systems go beyond the detec-
tion of attacks and provide reaction mechanisms to cope with detected
attacks or at least reduce their effect. Previous research works have pro-
posed methods to automatically select possible countermeasures capable
of ending the detected attack. But actually, countermeasures have side
effects, can be as harmful as the detected attack and not adapted to
the attacker’s actions. In this paper, we propose to improve the reaction
selection process by giving means to (i) quantify the effectiveness and
select the countermeasure that has the minimum negative side effect on
the information system by adopting a risk assessment and analysis ap-
proach, and (ii) assess the skill and knowledge level of the attacker from
a denfensive point of view.
Keywords: Intrusion detection system, attack scenario, countermea-
sure, risk analysis, potentiality, impact, skill and knowledge.
1 Introduction
In intrusion detection approach, the primary objective is to detect and identify
attacks, and then react to counter the detected attack to block it or to mitigate
its impact on the Information System (IS). There are two different approaches
for the reaction perspective: hot reaction [15] and policy based reaction [14, 11].
The first aims to launch a local action on the target machine to end a process,
or on target network component to block a traffic, that are the cause of the
launched alerts. The second acts on more general scope; it considers not only
the threats reported in the alerts, but also constraints and objectives of the
organization operating the IS and this by modifying the access control policy.
Therefore a trade-off can be established between security objectives, operation
objectives and constraints. Whatever the adopted approach, each countermea-
sure can have negative or positive side effects. The same countermeasure that
was activated to end an attack can make the IS more vulnerable, expose it to
other attacks, or even have an impact more disastrous than the attack itself.
For example Firewall reconfiguration is effective against a DOS attack, but can
be very harmful if valuable connections will be lost, therefore many questions
emerge: Is it better to stand still? Or is the attack harmful enough to react?
In this case, which countermeasure must be selected with minimum negative
side effects? To answer these questions, we adopt a Risk Assessment and Anal-
ysis approach. This approach is already used to analyze and evaluate the risks
that threaten organization assets. Our approach is to use the same approach to
evaluate the effectiveness of each countermeasure in real time and improve the
automated reaction mechanism. The first step of a risk analysis method is to
collect data that describes the system state in real-time. The second step is an-
alyzing them and finding the potential threats and their severity. The final step
is to study the countermeasure effectiveness to eliminate these threats or reduce
their severity: The goal is not always to block the attack, but to minimize the
risk incurred by target information system. Therefore a risk assessment method
is used to evaluate and quantify the risk of an attack and its countermeasures.
The method is useful to decide when it is suitable to react, and which counter-
measure should be activated. Another important aspect is the Attackers Skills
and Knowledge level (SK Level). Such data is useful for the automated reaction
process. If a novice script kiddie attacker is trying to establish a remote session,
a simple TCP reset will be enough to eliminate the detected attack. Otherwise,
in the case of an experienced attacker, the TCP reset can be ineffective and a
firewall reconfiguration may be needed. Therefore assessing the SK Level make
the reaction decision module more accurate and effective. We can assume that
a Risk Assessment and Analysis approach combined with the assessment of the
Attackers Skill and Knowledge level make the automated process of reaction and
countermeasure selection more accurate, realistic, cost effective, and with min-
imum intervention of the human administrator. In section 2 our solution using
risk analysis and skill and knowledge assessment approaches, and an implemen-
taion is showed in section 3. In section 4 related works are presented. Finally
section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Solution
To react against attacks, a fine and efficient diagnostic procedure to detect and
identify the intrusions is needed. However, due to the limitation and unreliability
of the intrusion detection probes like SNORT [8], only low-level events can be
detected with high rates of false alarms. Therefore, to detect and recognize the
current attack, an alerts correlation procedure is required for proper reaction.
The correlation procedure recognizes relationships between alerts in order to
associate these alerts into a more global intrusion scenario, and the intrusion
objectives that violate the predefined organization security policies. There are
many approaches that can be used for this purpose: implicit [19], explicit [16,
20] and semi-explicit [12, 21] correlations. The semi-explicit approach is based
on the description of the elementary intrusions corresponding to the alerts. This
approach then finds causal relationships between these elementary alerts and
connects these elementary alerts when such a relationship exists. The correlation
procedure then consists in building a scenario that corresponds to an attack
graph of steps corresponding to the elementary intrusions.
Semi-Explicit Correlation Definition Two LAMBDA models A and B are anti-
correlated if the post-condition of A matches the pre-condition of B. This semi-
explicit [12, 21] approach is more generic and flexible because only the elementary
steps are defined as entities and not the whole attacks scenario. The LAMBDA
[13] language can be used to describe these elementary steps by defining their
pre-conditions and post-conditions. Regarding reaction, it is also the most inter-
esting because it provides a precise diagnosis of the ongoing intrusion scenario
by construction the attack graph, predict the potential future steps and the
intrusion objectives.
Using an approach similar to the one used to describe elementary intrusions,
elementary countermeasures can be specified. In this case, anti-correlation [9]
can be used to find the countermeasures capable of ending a detected scenario.
Anti-Correlation Definition Two LAMBDA models A and B are anti-correlated
if the post-condition of A matches the pre-condition negation of B. The anti-
correlation [9] approach is based upon finding the appropriate countermeasure
that turn an elementary future step of an attack inexecutable due to precon-
ditions value modifications. Therefore, using the anti-correlation approach, the
administrator knows which countermeasures from a predefined library are capa-
ble of blocking the threat.
2.1 Risk Assessment Model
As explained in the previous section, the anti-correlation approach [9] can be
used of generating a set of candidate countermeasre capable of ending the de-
tected attack, but without assessing the impact of the detected attack nor these
candidate countermeasure. Therefore, this reaction approach can be refined by
combining it with the risk analysis model proposed in [17]. This model is used
to evaluate the Total Gravity Risk of the IS once an attack is detected and after
the simulated execution of the candidate countermeasure. Only the countermea-
sures that reduce the Total Gravity Risk are kept and a new set of Risk Efficient
Countermeasures (RISK EFF CM) is instantiated. The Total Risk Gravity can
be assessed after evaluating the Potentiality (POT) and the Impact (Imp) of the
detected attacks. The structure of the model is described in Figure 1.
Potentiality Pot The major factor Potentiality Pot measures the probabil-
ity of a given scenario to take place and achieve its objective with success. To
evaluate Pot, we must first evaluate its minor factors: natural exposition Expo
and dissuasive measures Diss and we have to take into account classification of
the attack also. The minor factors can be evaluated after the appropriate audit
clusters are calculated. These clusters are questions-tests that aim to evaluate
the system state (active services, existent vulnerabilities, etc.). The value zero
indicates that the studied scenario is impossible, and the value MAX VALUE
indicates that the occurrence and the successful execution of the scenario are
inevitable.
Fig. 1. Risk Assessment structure
Impact Imp The second major factor to evaluate Risk Gravity of an attack sce-
nario is Impact Imp. −−→Imp is defined as a vector with three cells that correspond
to the three fundamental security principles: Availability Avail, Confidentiality
Conf and Integrity Integ. Therefore, with each Intrusion Objective, a vector−−→
Imp is associated and should be evaluated. Actually, it is not possible to stat-
ically evaluate −−→Imp of a scenario (or more precisely the −−→Imp of the scenario’s
intrusion objective) directly because it depends on several dynamic elements.
The impact depends on the importance of the target assets −−−→Class, and the im-
pact reduction measures level −→IR that are deployed on the system to reduce and
limit the impact once the attack was successful.
Risk Gravity of an Attack Scenario or a Countermeasure Grav For
each detected attack, the risk gravity must be evaluated to estimate the danger
level of this attack. The risk is the combination of Potentiality and Impact using
a predefined function f . An attack that occurs frequently with little impact may
have the same risk level as another rare attack that have significant impact. If a
scenario has Pot or Imp equal to zero, the scenario’s gravity risk Grav will be
null. To assess the risk Gravity of a candidate countermeasure CMu, the same
function f is used to assess the risk as shown in the following equation:
GCMu = f(Pot = MAX VALUE, Imp = CMu.Impact) (1)
The use of MAX VALUE for the Pot parameter is justified by the fact that
countermeasures, contrary to detected attack scenarii, do not have intrinsic po-
tentiality. This can be explained by the fact that once a countermeasure is se-
lected, it must be activated successfully in the IS and therefore its impact must
be considered with maximum potentiality. For the attack scenarii, each one has
a proper potentiality that must be combined with the attack scenario impact to
deduce the risk gravity.
Total Risk Gravity Total Grav and Total Grav′u In most situations, the
correlation and reaction modules do not deal with one specific scenario. Instead,
these modules have to take into account many candidate and even simultaneous
scenarios. Therefore, before estimating the total gravity of risk, we must evaluate
the gravity of risk of each scenario separately. Then we define the Total gravity as
an ordered vector containing the values of gravity risk of each candidate scenario.
An order relation can be defined between the different instances of −−−−−−−−→Total Grav
using the lexicographic comparison. Therefore we are able to judge which graph
has the highest risk gravity. We define also
−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav′u similarly to
−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav,
where the difference is that
−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav′u is assessed with the new state of the
information system after the simulated execution of the countermeasure CMu.
Risk Efficient Countermeasures Set Once for each countermeasure u, GCMu
and
−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav′u are evaluated,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav CMu can be evaluated :
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav CMu =
−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav′u ∪GCMu (2)
Now, only the countermeasures from Anticorrelated CM that decrease the
total gravity risk are kept and a new set Risk Eff CM is defined that contains
only risk efficient countermeasures:
∀CMu ∈ Anticorrelated CM ;−−−−−−−−−−−−−→Total Grav CMu ≤ −−−−−−−−→Total Grav (3)
⇒ CMu ∈ Risk Eff CM
2.2 Skill and Knowledge Assessment
To react properly against a detected attack scenario, the choice of countermea-
sure depends on the attacker’s skill and knowledge level. To end an attack ex-
ecuted by a novice, a simple close connection can be effective, which it is not
the case when facing an expert attacker where a firewall configuration is needed.
Therefore, the assessment of the Attacker’s Skill and Knowledge Level would be
very useful to tune our reaction model. In fact, it would be useless to activate
a complex countermeasure against a beginner; or to activate a simple counter-
measure against an expert attacker who can easily bypass it. Another point is
that the attacker can have internal knowledge of the information system. For in-
stance, a remote attacker that have the proper credentials and is able to connect
from the first attempt, or an attacker that is able to predict the tcp sequence of
a connection that uses a complex algorithm (and not use the standard tcp se-
quence number incrementation algorithm), must be taken in consideration that
they have internal knowledge and/or high level of expertise.
SK Level Label To assess the Attacker’s Skill and Knowledge, a defensive
point of view must be adopted. The only information of the attacker’s action
accessible by the target information system is the generated alerts for each exe-
cuted step in the attack scenario. Each step is described with a specific language
like LAMBDA [13]. We propose to add a new label called SK Level (Skill and
Knowledge level). For the attack actions, this label indicates the minimum level
of skill and knowledge required to execute this action-step successfully. For the
countermeasure, it indicates the value of this level that the attacker can not
bypass once it is activated. This new label can have the values shown in Table
1.
Table 1. SK Level label values






Attacker’s SK Level and Skill and Knowledge Efficient Countermea-
sure Set We consider that an attacker capable of executing an attack step with
high SK Level is an expert attacker and thus, a more sophisticated counter-
measure is required. The Attackers Skill and Knowledge Level (SK Level) must
be evaluated to refine the countermeasure selection. A first approach to assess
the Attackers SK Level is to retrieve the SK Level maximum value among the
successfully executed attack steps. The use of Max function could not be ac-
curate enough and further advanced approaches must be explored. Once the
Attackers SK Level is assessed, only the countermeasures that have a SK Level
greater than the Attackers one will be kept. Hence, the selected countermeasure
is adapted to the Attackers Level and a new set called Skill and Knowledge
Efficient countermeasures (SK EFF CM) can be instantiated.
The correlation engine by determining the executed attack steps by an at-
tacker, is capable of assessing the attacker’s level of skill and knowledge At-
tacker SK Level. The first approach to evaluate Attacker SK Level can be done
using the following equation:
Attacker SK Level = Maxi(SK Leveli) (4)
where SK Leveli = Attack Stepi.SK Level and Stepi ∈ Executed Steps
Fig. 2. Risk Eff CM and SK Eff CM sets
A possible method is to set honeypots [18, 23] and redirect the attacker to
execute his/her attack steps on them. This will be used to collect the maximum
number eof xecuted steps to assess accurately his/her SK Level.
Once the Attacker SK Level had been assessed, only the countermeasures
from Risk Eff CM such that the SK Level is higher than Attacker SK Level
are kept, and a new set called SK Eff CM (See Figure .2) can be defined and
instantiated countermeasures:
∀CMu ∈ Risk Eff CM; Attacker SK Level ≤ CMu.SK Level (5)
⇒ CMu ∈ SK Eff CM
2.3 Countermeasure Selection Procedure
Once the Risk Eff CM and SK Eff CM have been instantiated (See Figure 2),
a clear automatic procedure can be applied to select the most appropriate coun-
termeasure :
If SK EFF CM 6= ∅
Select(MinSK Level(CMu))
If Risk EFF CM 6= ∅
Select(MinRisk(CMu))
Select(None)
3 Implementation of the Solution
CRIM (Correlation and Recognition of Malicious Intentions) [10] is a prototype
that has been developed by Telecom Bretagne. It implements the fusion, semi ex-
plicit correlation and anti-correlation features using the LAMBDA language. It
collects the generated alerts and aggregates them. Then CRIM visualizes the de-
tected attacks in real time, the future steps that can be executed by the attacker
using the semi-explicit correlation principle, and the candidate countermeasure
using the anti-correlation principle. As a proof of concept, a new module has been
created to validate our proposal briefly described in the previous sections. As
shown in 3, this module is used to assess the Risk Gravity of the detected attack
scenarii and the candidate countermeasures, then it instantiates the Risk Eff CM
countermeasure set. A first version of this module has been developped, but no
public version is yet released. Another module takes in charge of assessing the
Attackers SK Level and compare it to the SK Level of the countermeasures that
belong to the Risk Eff CM, then it instantiates the SK Eff CM set. Once the
two sets are instantiated, the selection procedure can be applied to activate the
most appropriate and effective countermeasure. Works has begun to develop a
first version of the module.
The Figure 3 shows the output of the CRIM prototype corresponding to
the detection of the Mitnick attack.The mitnick attack aims to gain remote
illegal shell by causing a DoS to a legal machine and then ”stealing” its pre-
established tcp connection with the target machine. The attack graph generated
by CRIM using the LAMBDA language [13] is composed of four elementary
steps . We suppose that the attacker was capable to execute successfully the
first three steps. Therefore one final step remains before the attacker achieves
his or her intrusion objective Illegal Remote Shell on a critical machine. Dark
green circles represent elementary steps of the intrusion scenario, light yellow
losanges correspond to candidate reaction and boxes are intrusion objectives.
The attacker has executed successfully the first three steps, and thus only
one step remains. Therefore the potentiality and therefore the Total Risk Grav
have high values (=4 ). In other hand, the Attacker’s SK Level = Max(1,3,2) =
3.
There two candidate countermeasures are capable of reducing the total grav-
ity risk from 4 to 1 (See Total Risk CMx in Figure 3, therefore the two coun-
termeasures are in the Risk Eff CM. The Attacker’s skill and knowledge level is
three and that indicates the fact he or she is not a novice. Thererfore a block
connection that has a SK Level = 2 could be not efficient and a firewall reconfigu-
ration that has a SK Level = 3 is needed. Hence only the second countermeasure
is in SK Eff CM and recommended to be launched.
4 Related Works
Intrusion detection systems with reaction capabilities like SNORT [8] already
exist. SNORT offers reflex reaction when a given attack is detected like blocking
packets, sending visible warning and logging. No advanced reasoning on the
reaction consequence is conducted, and side effects could appear with devastating
consequences. Many industrial solutions exist like IBM Internet Security [5] and
Cisco Secure IDS [2]. These solutions are efficient in intrusion prevention and
offer protection against well known attacks with the corresponding impact using
Fig. 3. CRIM output snapshot
database like CVSS [6]. The main drawback is that there is no following up and
no monitoring of the detected attacks to assess their risks and impacts in real
time once they bypassed the security and prevention measures, dependably on
the target organizations and assets. Another limitation is that these solutions
handle vulnerabilities exploit without considering the complete scenarii. There
are several Risk Assessment methods like EBIOS [7, 1], MARION [3], MEHARI
[4], etc. These methods are used to manage system assets and evaluate the
risk that threatens these assets; they are unfortunately abstract, informal and
incompatible with intrusion detection and computer systems: Many elements and
parameters are related to physical and nature disasters (fire, earthquake, failure,
etc.). There are also elements that need redefinition to be compatible with the
intrusion detection systems like potentiality and impact of a threat. As suggested
in [22], the risk exposure can be evaluated in terms of business perspective by
using financial metrics. Another problem is that these methods can not be used
in real-time. Our goal is to evaluate the system and the available countermeasure
actions in real-time to help the administrator to chose the best action, or to make
the reaction process automatic with minimum human intervention.
5 Conclusion and Future works
A first version of the Risk Analysis module has been implemented, and cur-
rent works is being conducted to develop the Skill and Knowledge Assessment
module. Series of tests will be conducted to evaluate the effectiveness and the
performance of these added modules.
First, the tests will handle classical attacks (e.g. Mitnick Attack, Password
Guessing, etc.). In the future, attack and countermeasure will be modeled with
LAMBDA models, and attacks simulations will be conducted for VoIP services:
CRIM will control and supervise the VoIP services status, detect and recognize
attacks in real time, then conduct a Risk analysis and Skill and Knowledge as-
sessment to propose to the administrator, or to the automated reaction module,
the most effective countermeasure. Intrusion detection systems aim to detect at-
tacks, however such detecion is not quite useful without reaction. Against given
attacks, there could be many possible countermeasres. Our approach will help
administrators taking their decisions and selecting the proper countermeasure(s)
by assessing the impact of the detected attacks and the candidate countermeasre.
We are even conducting further researches and tests to turn the reaction selec-
tion and activation process fully automated. As we know, no similar approaches
exists in the litterature.
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